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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-TRANSFERS OF MINERAL RIGHTS IN
SOIL DEPOSITS AS LEASE OR SALE-Petitioner executed a written agreement
with a contractor in 1954 whereby the contractor acquired the right to
enter petitioner's land and extract sand and gravel for a fixed amount per
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cubic yard. This agreement was terminated in 1955 when the excavations
had reached the desired level of street access. Petitioner had entered into
a previous oral agreement in 1949 with a different party for the sale of the
gravel on the same land down to the same elevation, but that party had
not fully exploited the agreement.1 Petitioner claimed that the agreements
were sales of sand and gravel in place down to the level required to make
the land marketable. The Commissioner contended that these arrangements were merely leases of the property with the payments constituting
rent and therefore taxable as ordinary income. The Tax Court decided in
favor of the Commissioner.2 On appeal, held, reversed. The terms of the
1949 and 1954 agreements, considered in light of the intent and purpose
of the parties, and the divestiture of any rights of petitioner in the sand
and gravel after severance, indicate a transfer of all economic interest in
the in-place mineral rights; therefore, the proceeds are to be treated as gain
from the sale of a capital asset. Linehan v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 276
(1st Cir. 1961).
To obtain preferential capital gains treatment, there must be a "sale"
or exchange of a capital asset.3 Generally, in determining whether there
has been a sale, a court will apply the usual rules of intent, form, and
purpose of the agreement to pass absolute title in the property immediately
or at a future date in accordance with the terms of the contract.4 Thus,
for example, gains from a conditional sales contract,5 or a business transfer
with a lease-back provision6 are treated as gains from a sale or exchange
of a capital asset. In most instances where full consideration is not presently given, as in the above examples, the vendor retains what might commonly be considered an economic or security interest in the property until
the transaction is complete. Nevertheless, for tax purposes a sale has
occurred as of the time of execution of the agreement.
However, in situations involving mineral rights, the general criterion
used to determine if a particular transaction is to be afforded capital gains
treatment is whether the taxpayer has retained any "economic interest"
in the mineral rights transferred. 7 The courts reason that if any economic
interest is retained there has not been a sale, and conversely if there has
been a complete divestiture of all economic interest there must have been
1 In addition there was an earlier oral agreement for the "sale" of the sand and
gravel in 1943, the nature of which was undisclosed.
2 Charles A. Linehan, 35 T.C. 533 (1960).
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222.
4 See, e.g., Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446, 465-66 (1949).
G Truman Bowen, supra note 4.
6 Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
7 See, e.g., Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Palmer v. Bender,
287 U.S. 551 (1933); Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961).
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a sale; thus the two possibilities are considered mutually exclusive.a This
concept of "economic interest" is, however, more restrictive than what one
might normally consider the term to encompass. The taxpayer is held to
have retained an economic interest in every case where he has retained any
interest in the minerals still in place and has secured from any form of
legal-relationship income derived from the extraction of the minerals to
which he must look for a return on his capital.9 This test originated in
cases involving the question of depletion allowances and has been applied
by the courts in conjunction with the so-called "substance over form"
theory.10 This has been especially apparent in cases dealing with oil deposits where the arrangements are often extremely complex, with the courts
seemingly reluctant to bring in common-law property concepts which may
tend to cloud ~e intricate relationship established by the contracts. 11
In situations involving soil deposits the taxpayer is generally seeking
to establish a sale of the mineral deposits in order to obtain capital gain
treatment since the depletion allowance in this area is relatively low. While
the federal courts of appeal and district courts verbally adhere to the economic interest and true substance tests carried over from the oil depletion
cases, they seem to approach the problem as a general "sale or exchange"
question. With an apparent attitude favoring taxpayers,12 these courts
have stressed the factors present in the cases which would normally point
to a sale rather than a relinquishment of all "economic interest." Reliance
is placed on such indicia as the terms of the agreement set out in words
of sale,1s the intent of the parties to sell,14 and large initial payments with
fixed periodic payments as indicating an outright sale by the taxpayer with
no further interest in development of the mineral resources.11i
Until recently, the Tax Court had viewed some of these court decisions
as erroneous.is It felt that a retained economic interest was present in some
of the decisions since the agreements involved made provision to pay the
consideration on a per unit basis as the mineral was extracted, the vendor
s See Griffith v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 454, 458 (D. Wyo. 1960). See also
Samuel L. Green, 35 T.C. 1065 (1961).
9 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); Samuel
L. Green, supra note 8, at 1071. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.611-l(b) (1962).
10 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
11 See Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961).
12 See Commissioner v. Remer, 260 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1958); Barker v. Commissioner,
250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957); Gowans v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1957);
Crowell Land &: Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957); Griffith v.
United States, 180 F. Supp. 454 (D. Wyo. 1960); Bel v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 360
(W. D. La. 1958) (for taxpayer). But see Albritton v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 49 (5th Cir.
1957) (against taxpayer where the agreement was clearly i?- terms of a lease.
13 Commissioner v. Remer, supra note 12; Bel v. Umted States, supra note 12.
14 Barker v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957).
15 Crowell Land &: Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957).
16 See, e.g., Robert M. Dann, 30 T.C. 499, 507 (1958).
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retaining a reversion in the soil in place. Also, the taxpayer in such cases
had no right to obligate the "purchaser" of the in-place deposits to move
his deposits off the taxpayer's land under threat of an action for breach of
contract.17 However, with the mounting pressure of decisions handed down
by the district courts favorable to the transferor18 of the in-place mineral
deposits and the reversals of Tax Court determinations in the courts of
appeal,1 9 the Tax Court has recently altered its stand by accepting the decisions of those tribunals as reconcilable.20 The test formulated to control all
of the cases is now whether the contract itself resulted in a conveyance of the
deposits "in place" so that the owner no longer retained any interest in
such deposits.21
However, basic differences between the Tax Court approach and that of
the courts of appeals and the district courts still exist. The Tax Court looks
to the economic interest, if any, retained by the taxpayer at the time of the
agreement. Thus, if after the contract is executed the taxpayer no longer depends on the extraction of minerals for his consideration (except as a convenient method of determining the extent of his consideration where the quantity of matter to be extracted is not definitely known), and where he may
force the purchaser to remove all the in-place minerals purchased within a
stated or reasonable time or be subject to a breach of contract action, then he
is held to have retained no economic interest in the in-place minerals deposits.22 And since the two are mutually exclusive, it necessarily follows that
if he has retained no economic interest then there must have been a sale of
those deposits. The other federal courts usually take the opposite approach,
relying mainly on form and intent to find a sale.23 If a sale is found they
reason that there necessarily could not have been a retained economic interest; and thus, the courts do not attempt to sift thoroughly the elements of
the case to ascertain if any such interest does in fact exist.24
The principal case purports to adopt the former approach by first deter17 E.g.,

18

Robert M. Dann, supra note 16.

E.g., Griffith v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 454 (D. Wyo. 1960); Bel v. United

States, 160 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1958).
19 Barker v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing 24 T.C. ll60 (1955);
Crowell Land &: Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1957), reversing
25 T.C. 223 (1955).
20 See Samuel L. Green, 35 T.C. 1065 (1961).
21 Samuel L. Green, supra note 20, at 1071.
22 See Robert M. Dann, 30 T.C. 499 (1958). See also Samuel L. Green, 35 T.C. 1065
(1961); Charles A. Linehan, 35 T.C. 533 (1960).
23 See Barker v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1957); Bel v. United States, 160
F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1958).
24 In Baker v. Commissioner, supra note 23, at 198, the court indicates that at
least the sand and gravel cases are to receive individual treatment stating, "Nor
should our conclusion in this case [sand and gravel) be understood as an indication
that we have any views concerning analogous or similar transactions in the field of
oil, gas and mineral extraction."
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mining whether there is any economic interest. However, the court arguably misconstrued the real thrust of the test. This is evidenced by the
importance attached to the fact that once the gravel was severed from the
land, the taxpayer no longer had any interest in it. That observation, while
true, is not determinative of the problem. What is essential is the nature
of the taxpayer's rights, if any, to the in-place mineral deposits, or any
portion thereof, the moment after the purported sale. The facts indicate
that only the right to enter the premises and extract the gravel was sold,
that there was no obligation upon the purchaser to remove all or any of
the gravel "sold," and that the bulk of the consideration was dependent
solely on the optional excavation and exploitation of the deposit. To this
may be added the facts that the same general in-place sand and gravel
deposit had been "sold" twice previously, that during one "sale" the price
was raised from 10 to 18 cents per cubic yard, that a reversion was retained
in the in-place gravel sold which was not extracted, and that a per unit basis
of payment was not necessary to any of these agreements since the quantity
of the in-place gravel was ascertainable. 25 Thus, the principal case apparently establishes a haven for those taxpayers who fail to put the transfer
of their minerals in terms of an absolute sale, but who disclaim any interest
in the mineral after severance. This deviation from the in-place oil deposit
cases seems unwarranted, and review by the Supreme Court is necessary
to clarify the situation.26 In addition the question remains whether retained economic interest should be determinative of the issue or whether,
for purpose of the capital gain provision, an economic interest may properly
be retained after a sale.
Philip Sotiroff

See Charles A. Linehan, 35 T.C. 533 (1960).
See Schoenbaum, Substance and Form in Assignments of In-Oil Rights and Other
Mineral Interests, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX 443 (1959).
25

26

